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INTRODUCTION
[1]
On a cool summer morning in upstate New York, a man sitting on
his couch types in the coordinates to a warehouse in Virginia on his phone
and presses “engage.” At that moment, the engine of a vehicle several
miles away starts up, and the vehicle slowly backs out of the driveway.
Without a driver or any occupants, the vehicle travels several hundred
miles from the driveway in New York to the warehouse in Virginia.
Meanwhile, the man who engaged the vehicle remains seated on his couch
in upstate New York. The man has engaged an autonomous vehicle (AV),
capable of operating entirely independent from any human intervention
and capable of complying with traffic laws. 1

*

J.D. Candidate 2014, Michigan State University College of Law; B.S. 2011, Liberal
Studies, Grand Valley State University. I would like to thank Professor Catherine Grosso
for her encouragement and advice throughout the drafting of this Note. Thank you also to
the editors of the Michigan State Law Review for their help in the initial stages of this
Note and to the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology for their tireless work on this
piece.

1

See Sebastian Thrun, What We’re Driving At, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com.au/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html [hereinafter “What
We’re Driving At”].
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[2]
While this may seem like a perfectly harmless and legal activity,
the potential legal ramifications and the potential effect on individual
liberty are immense. Prior to engaging the vehicle, an associate of the
man on the couch retrofit the vehicle with additional cargo holds to store
hundreds of pounds of cocaine and marijuana. Currently, police use
traffic stops and drug-interdiction stops as a method to fight the “war on
drugs.” 2 The Fourth Amendment permits these stops as long as the officer
has reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a law has been
broken. 3 Alternatively, officers can search vehicles for contraband if they
have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found therein. 4
Since the AV is designed to abide traffic laws, 5 it is unlikely that there
would be a lawful reason for an officer to stop the vehicle based on
probable cause that a traffic violation occurred. Since there is no
occupant, officers cannot observe the behavior of the driver as officers
often do in hopes of gaining reasonable suspicion to make a stop. 6
Without probable cause that a law has been broken, or reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle, the Fourth Amendment does not permit an
officer to stop the vehicle. The introduction of AVs into our society may
shift the way we look at the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
jurisprudence and the ability of the police to make drug-interdiction stops,
but ultimately, AVs will remain stoppable under the Fourth Amendment.
2

See, e.g., Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The
Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1, 3-6 (2001).
3

See id. at 4 (explaining the procedure of drug-interdiction stops); see also infra Part
II.C.

4

See infra Part II.C.2.

5

See Susan Kuchinskas, Crash Course: Training the Brain of a Driverless Car, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=autonomousdriverless-car-brain.

6

See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding border patrol
agents had reasonable suspicion based largely on the agent’s observations of the
occupants of the vehicle). Without occupants such observation would be impossible.
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Though the police may be slightly more restricted in stopping AVs, any
increase in the government’s power to stop automobiles could be
devastating to our privacy, and courts should refrain from increasing the
government’s power in this arena.
[3]
This Note examines the current state of Fourth Amendment search
and seizure jurisprudence with relation to automobiles to illustrate how
AVs may change this area of law. Part I examines the history and
development of AVs and current regulation of the vehicles. Part II
discusses Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including the history of
automobile searches, stops, and consent to search. Part III illustrates how
AVs will slightly change the police’s ability to make drug-interdiction
stops, and how this may affect our privacy interests in the future,
ultimately concluding that any further extension of the Fourth Amendment
will unconstitutionally violate our right to be free from unreasonable
government intrusion.
I. THE BEGINNING OF AVS
[4]
In 1962, Hanna-Barbera Studios released a cartoon set in a
futuristic city in 2062. 7 The Jetsons featured futuristic inventions ranging
from a robotic maid to flying cars. 8 The utility of George Jetson's flying
car is illustrated in the introduction to the show, where George can be seen
taking his hands off the control panel and attending to his family. 9 The
Jetsons gave us a glimpse into the world of the future—a world that is
becoming reality.

7

See Grey Hall, Space Family 2062: The Jetsons, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.examiner.com/article/space-family-2062-the-jetsons.

8

See Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, The Jetsons’ Visions of the Future 51 Years Ago SpotOn, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/thejetsons8217-vision-of-the-future-51-years-ago-spoton/story-e6frfro0-1226725268775.
9

See guillermo3650, The Jetsons TV Intro, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yjy-fnsmWR4.
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A. An Autonomous What?
[5]
For years, various agencies and departments have been trying to
perfect a vehicle of the future like the one featured in The Jetsons. Over
the last several decades, and more rapidly in the past several years,
innovators across the automotive and technology sectors have been
inching closer to this futuristic technology. 10
1. The History of AVs
[6]
Discussion of AVs started in 1939 at the World’s Fair where
General Motors showcased its Futurama exhibit predicting AVs would be
standard by the 1960s. 11 While AVs were not standard by then,
development actually began as early as the 1980s with the initiation of the
EUREKA 12 PROMETHEUS program in Europe. 13 The program focused
on developing computer-aided driving systems that would use “electronic
traffic-flow monitors to increase communication among drivers and
automatically detect any risk of collision.” 14
10

See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Google Car: Not the First Self-Driving Vehicle, PCMAG
(Oct. 11, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370598,00.asp.
11

Daniel Bartz, Autonomous Cars Will Make Us Safer, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2009, 8:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2009/11/autonomous-cars.
12

The EUREKA program was a research and development cooperative between nineteen
European countries aimed at bringing innovative technologies to the market. See David
Dickson, EUREKA!, TECH. REV., Aug. 1988, at 27.
13

See id. at 28. PROMETHEUS stands for the Program for European Traffic and
Highest Efficiency and Unprecedented Safety. Id.

14

Id. A similar technology, now known as vehicle communication systems, is still in the
works, though proponents of AVs argue that the costly infrastructure required by those
systems make AVs more practical. See Transcript of The Future of Driving, THE DIANE
REHM SHOW, at 10:24:33-10:25:49 (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:06 AM),
http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-09-27/future-driving/transcript. Testing of
vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communication is ongoing, but Dr. Alberto Broggi, IEEE senior member and professor of

4
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[7]
Later, the Defense Department’s DARPA 15 Grand Challenges
were initiated, not to increase the safety of the general public on the roads,
but to reduce the number of soldiers who are exposed to dangerous
conditions in war zones. 16 DARPA hosted a total of three Challenges with
participants from Germany, Australia, universities, various industries,
private individuals, and even a high school. 17 The first two events, held in
2004 and 2005, required the AVs to navigate through the desert on
different road conditions, through obstacles, and through areas with little
or no global positioning system (GPS) service. 18 The 2004 Challenge
required participants to traverse a 150-mile course, but unfortunately, none
of the fifteen qualifiers succeeded. 19 Just a year later, five teams
computer engineering at the University of Parma, notes that the current AVs being
developed require less rather than more infrastructure. See Doug Newcomb, You Won’t
Need a Driver’s License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM),
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/ieee-autonomous-2040/ [hereinafter
“Newcomb”].
15

DARPA stands for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Our Work,
DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
16

Christian Berger et al., introduction to EXPERIENCE FROM THE DARPA URBAN
CHALLENGE 3, 4 (Christopher Rouff & Mike Hinchey eds., 2012); see Overview,
DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/overview.asp (last visited Oct. 16,
2013). DARPA’s rationale for the Urban Challenge:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public
Law 106-398, Congress mandated in Section 220 that “It shall be a goal
of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely
controlled technology such that . . . by 2015, one-third of the
operational ground combat vehicles are unmanned.”
Id.
17

Berger et al., supra note 16, at 4.

18

Id. at 4-5.

19

Id. at 5. The Carnegie Mellon University Red Team’s vehicle the “Sandstorm” went
the farthest, but it only made it 7.4 miles. Id.
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completed the second DARPA Grand Challenge, and the vehicle
“Stanley” from Stanford University took home the $2 million prize. 20
[8]
Following the success of the 2005 Grand Challenge, DARPA held
its first Urban Challenge, which required the AVs to navigate through an
urban environment rather than the rural environment used in the previous
Challenges. 21 The AVs were required to complete the sixty-mile course
within six hours, while following all relevant traffic laws and navigating
through obstacles like busy intersections and lane changes. 22 While the
teams received data about the routes prior to the race, 23 “freely navigatable
[sic] zones” required the AVs to navigate through areas without any lane
markings and to find a previously assigned parking space. 24 Moreover,
the vehicles were able to use GPS; however, they had to be able to
navigate without it while remaining in their lane in areas of GPS outage or
with insufficient GPS signal quality. 25 The team from Carnegie Mellon
placed first with its vehicle, “Boss.” 26 While the Urban Challenge brought
us one step closer to a product that could be operated on public roads, it
20

Id. This illustrates how quickly the technology is evolving.

21

Id. at 3, 5-6.

22

Berger et al., supra note 16, at 6. The course also featured fifty human driven vehicles
around which the AVs had to safely maneuver. Id.
23

Id. at 9. A route network definition file (RNDF) was given to the teams twenty-four
hours before the race, which gave participants details about the road networks the
vehicles would face during the challenge. Id. The mission data files (MDF), which
provided information about the start and end points of the race, were given to teams five
minutes before the race and five minutes before the start of each mission. Id.
24

Id. at 10.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 7. Stanford’s “Junior” took second, and Virginia Tech’s “Odin” took third place.
Id.; see also Video and Animations from the NQE, STANFORD RACING TEAM,
http://cs.stanford.edu/group/roadrunner/video.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (featuring
several videos of Junior in action during the qualifying rounds).

6
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did not require the AVs to detect or react to traffic signals or pedestrians—
a feat necessary before AVs can be sold to the general public. 27
2. AVs Today
[9]
The most widely recognized AV today is the “Google Car.” 28 Dr.
Sebastian Thrun, the lead engineer of Stanford’s Racing Team and the
Director of the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Lab, 29 is one of the
engineers of the project. 30 The Google Team is comprised of leading
engineers in the field, including Chris Urmson, 31 Mike Montemerlo, 32 and
Anthony Levandowski. 33 Thrun and the Google Team’s efforts were

27

See Berger et al., supra note 16, at 10.

28

See Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE. This YouTube video produced by
Google not only shows the Google Car in action, but also shows one of the many benefits
these vehicles can bring to the general public. See id.
29

The Team, STANFORD RACING TEAM,
http://cs.stanford.edu/group/roadrunner/team.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Dr. Thrun
was the lead engineer of “Stanley,” winner of the second DARPA Grand Challenge and
“Junior,” runner up in the Urban Challenge. See Thrun Reappears with Google Backing:
Cars that Drive Themselves, Q. NEWSL. OF THE INST. OF NAVIGATION (The Inst. of
Navigation, Manassas, Va.), Fall 2010, at 12.
30

See Sebastian Thrun: Google’s Driverless Car, TED (Mar. 2011),
http://www.ted.com/talks/sebastian_thrun_google_s_driverless_car.html [hereinafter
Google’s Driverless Car].
31

What We’re Driving At, supra note 1. Chris Urmson was the leader of the technical
team for Carnegie Mellon, the team that won the 2007 Urban Challenge. Id.
32

Id. Mike Montemerlo led the software development for the 2005 Stanford Racing
Team. Id.
33

Id. Anthony Levandowski helped build the first autonomous motorcycle and a Prius
that delivered a pizza without a driver inside. Id.

7
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guided by a desire to reduce automobile injuries and fatalities. 34
According to the Google Car project manager Anthony Levandowski,
there are 40,000 casualties in America from automobile accidents and
approximately ninety percent are a result of human error. 35 As of October
2010, the Google Car had already driven 140,000 miles through California
and the surrounding areas without an accident; that number is now well
above 300,000. 36
[10] The Google Car is equipped with several sensors to enable it to
“see” 37 the world around it. 38 Cameras on the vehicle look at traffic lights,
while lasers “measure the world all around it in three dimensions and
radars [] track other vehicles and their speeds.” 39 A central computer in
the vehicle then processes the information and allows the vehicle to make
decisions based on the data received. 40 In addition, the Google Car
utilizes GoogleMaps and GPS technology, though the vehicles do not rely

34

See id.; Google’s Driverless Car, supra note 30. This video also illustrates the
technology in use. Id.

35

The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:09:24.

36

What We’re Driving At, supra note 1; see also Doug Newcomb, Feds Try to Stay
Ahead of the Rise of the Robo-Car, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2012, 1:28 PM),
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/10/nhtsa-autonomous-cars/. Thrun also notes that
throughout the testing Google has always had a driver in the vehicle to ensure the testing
is conducted as safely as possible. What We’re Driving At, supra note 1.
37

Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011,
9:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/howgoogle-self-driving-car-works#.

38

The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:10:25.

39

Id.

40

Id.

8
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on GPS to stay within a designated lane. 41 While the Google Car and its
technology is probably the most widely known, especially outside of the
technology sector, Google is not alone in AV development. 42 BMW has
implemented a system called ConnectedDrive Connect, which is designed
to provide lower-level automated technology, though it has completed
over 5,000 kilometers in “highly-automated” mode. 43 Similarly, Volvo is
developing a system intended to navigate traffic jams or traffic moving up
to 31 miles per hour. 44 Volvo’s technology is not yet fully autonomous,
but Volvo hopes to achieve that goal in the future. 45 General Motors has
also been developing a similar technology called “Super Cruise,” which is

41

See What We’re Driving At, supra note 1. Anthony Levandowski explains that GPS is
helpful to know what town the vehicle is in, but the intricacies of driving are handled by
the sensors. The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:11:34.
42

Google is exclusively developing fully autonomous technology, while many of the
other manufacturers are developing incremental technology like driver assistance
programs that can be implemented more quickly than fully autonomous technology. See
supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
43

Peter Murray, A Look at BMW’s Semi-Autonomous Driving Car, SINGULARITY HUB
(Feb. 2, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://singularityhub.com/2012/02/02/a-look-at-bmws-semiautonomous-driving-car/; see also BMW ConnectedDrive, BMW,
http://www.bmw.com/com/en/insights/technology/technology_guide/articles/connecteddr
ive.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
44

Jeffrey N. Ross, Watch Volvo’s Autonomous Car System in Action, Before It Shows Up
in 2014, AUTOBLOG (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:31 PM),
http://www.autoblog.com/2012/10/24/watch-volvos-autonomous-car-system-in-actionbefore-it-shows-u/.
45

See id. Volvo was also involved in the SARTRE (Safe Road Trains for the
Environment) project, a collaboration by several European corporations, which just last
year successfully completed a road train on public roads in Europe. See SupercarHall,
2012 Volvo—SARTRE Road Train on Public Road (A-roll), YOUTUBE (May 28, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-jQ1U9KZfWg. A road train is a convoy led by a
human driver. Id. The remaining cars in the convoy are in autonomous mode and
communicate wirelessly with the lead vehicle. Id. This video illustrates the technology
as well as the process of initiated autonomous mode. See id.
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capable of steering, braking, and keeping a vehicle in its lane. 46 Lastly, in
early January 2013, Toyota announced its Lexus Advanced Active Safety
Research Vehicle. 47 At this point the vehicle is intended to be semiautonomous, or to act as a “co-pilot,” but Toyota suspects its technology
will evolve into a fully autonomous vehicle. 48
[11] AVs are coming. 49 General Motors expects semi-autonomous
vehicles to be on the market by the middle of the decade and fully
autonomous vehicles to be available by the end of the decade. 50 Some
estimate that driver’s licenses will be a thing of the past by 2040, and the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) predicts seventyfive percent of all vehicles on the road will be fully autonomous by that
same time. 51 In fact, society—rather than technology—may pose the

46

Self-Driving Car in Cadillac’s Future, CADILLAC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/cadillac/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/20
12/Apr/0420_cadillac.html.
47

Erico Guizzo, Toyota’s Semi-Autonomous Car Will Keep You Safe, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Jan. 8, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificialintelligence/toyota-semi-autonomous-lexus-car-will-keep-you-safe.
48

Id. The hardware on Toyota’s vehicle is almost the same as that used on the Google
Car, so it seems entirely plausible that this vehicle will develop into a fully autonomous
vehicle in the future. Id.
49

See Jim Motavalli, Self-Driving Cars Will Take Over by 2040, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012,
11:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/eco-nomics/2012/09/25/self-driving-cars-willtake-over-by-2040/ (noting that approximately ten billion dollars was spent in 2011 on
“advanced driver assistance systems” and that is expected to grow to as much as $130
billion by 2016).
50

Newcomb, supra note 14; Emerging Technology: Driving Safety, Efficiency and
Independence, GEN. MOTORS,
http://www.gm.com/vision/design_technology/emerging_technology.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2013).
51

Newcomb, supra note 14.

10

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

biggest hurdles in the transition from traditional automobiles to AVs.52
Some drivers simply enjoy driving and will not want to give that up;
others may be afraid to relinquish control of their vehicle to a computer.53
Regardless of the hurdles, AVs are coming. With the AV technology
rapidly developing, the legal field needs to respond.
B. AVs and the Law
[12] Currently, the law lags behind the development of AVs. 54 As of
October 2012, only three states—Nevada, Florida, and California—had
enacted legislation regarding AVs. 55 California, the state where Google is
based, was the last of the three to pass legislation. 56 Of those three, only
Nevada has passed detailed regulations regarding the use, licensing, and
testing of AVs. 57 Technically, AVs were not explicitly prohibited in these
states even before the legislation, 58 but Google is encouraging lawmakers
52

See Motavalli, supra note 49.

53

See id.; Newcomb, supra note 14.

54

See The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:08:16-10:09:24.

55

See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85-316.86,
319.145 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100 (2013). Michigan is currently considering
similar legislation, which is expected to pass soon. David Shepardson, Snyder Wants
State to Be Leader for Emerging Automated Technology, DENVER POST (Feb. 15, 2013,
11:58 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/auto/news/ci_22599372. Colorado, on the other
hand, rejected a proposal to legalize AVs. Colorado Rejects Driverless Car Proposal,
CBS DENVER (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/02/05/coloradorejects-driverless-car-proposal/.
56

Claire Cain Miller, With a Push from Google, California Legalizes Driverless Cars,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/with-apush-from-google-california-legalizes-driverless-cars/. See generally VEH. § 38750.
57

See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.

58

See The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:13:18; see also Miller, supra note 56.
Additionally, the California Vehicle Code simply defines a motor vehicle as “a vehicle

11
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to create legislation and regulations to legitimize the technology and to
ensure the development and use of the technology is done safely by other
manufacturers. 59
1. Nevada Pioneers AV Regulation
[13] In early 2012, Nevada became the first state to pass legislation and
regulation regarding autonomous vehicles. 60 Effective March 1, 2012,
Nevada passed enabling legislation authorizing the Nevada Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) to regulate AVs. 61 Among other things, the
legislation gave the DMV authority to regulate the operation, minimum
safety standards, and testing requirements for AVs. 62 The Nevada DMV
regulation, also adopted March 1, 2012, establishes several important
policies. 63 First, the regulation defines more specifically what constitutes
an AV by explaining what kind of technology is not covered under this
that it self-propelled,” which would include an AV. VEH. § 415. Similarly, the provision
for unlawful operation does not suggest an AV would be prohibited. See id. § 24002.
Likewise, Nevada defines a motor vehicle as one that is self-propelled and can be used on
a public highway. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482.075, 482.135. Florida uses a similar
definition. See FLA. STAT. § 316.003(21). The Florida law does, however, suggest some
problem for AVs absent the enabling legislation since it requires an operator be
physically in control of the vehicle. See id. § 316.003(25). A physically present operator
of an AV could be considered “in actual physical control” of the vehicle since the
operator could take over at any time. Id. The current enabling legislation requires a
physically present operator and someone to engage and disengage the technology, so
arguably this provision would not have acted to prohibit AVs absent the enabling
legislation. See id. §§ 316.85, 316.86, 319.145.
59

The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:09:24-10:10:22.

60

Compare VEH. § 38750, and FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85, 316.86, 319.145, with NEV. REV.
STAT. § 482A.100.
61

NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100.

62

Id.

63

See generally NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2012).

12
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regulation. 64 Specifically, the regulation states that “vehicle[s] enabled
with a safety system or driver assistance system” are not classified as AVs
unless the system can operate without a driver monitoring it.65
Additionally, the regulation states that whoever engages the vehicle will
be considered the “operator,” whether or not the operator is in the vehicle
while it is engaged. 66 Likewise, the operator is considered the “driver” for
enforcement of traffic laws and similar motor vehicle laws. 67 During
testing, however, the regulation requires two people to be in the vehicle,
including one who is able to “take complete control of the vehicle” if
necessary. 68 Further, this regulation essentially establishes liability for
accidents. 69 Lastly, Nevada has added a legislation making it legal to text
while operating an AV. 70

64

See id.

65

Id. § 482A.010. The regulation specifically states that “electronic blind spot
assistance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, adaptive cruise
control, lane keep assistance, lane departure warnings and traffic jams and queuing
assistance” are not included under this regulation. Id.
66

Id. § 482A.020. This provision suggests AVs will be able to be operated without a
physically present operator.
67

Id. § 482A.030.

68

NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130(1).

69

Presumably this would enable the current insurance law to apply to autonomous
vehicles regardless of the presence of the operator at the time of the accident. But see
John Markoff, Collision in the Making Between Self-Driving Cars and How the World
Works, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/technology/googles-autonomous-vehicles-drawskepticism-at-legal-symposium.html?_r=0 (stating that insurance regulation for
autonomous vehicles has yet to be addressed).
70

NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484B.165(1)(a), (7) (2013). This further suggests how little, if at
all, the driver will need to be involved in the operation of the vehicle.
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2. Florida Follows the Leader
[14] In July 2012, Florida enacted legislation similar to the legislation
in Nevada. 71 This statute provides a definition of “autonomous vehicle”
that is almost identical to the Nevada statute. 72 This statute differs,
though, in that it does not require operators to have special endorsements;
a valid driver’s license is all that is necessary to operate a vehicle in
autonomous mode. 73 The Florida law also provides immunity for the
original manufacturer if a third party equips a vehicle with autonomous
technology. 74
3. California Catches Up
[15] On September 25, 2012, at Google’s headquarters, California’s
Governor Jerry Brown signed legislation initiated by Senator Alex Padilla
to authorize the use of AVs in California. 75 California defines an AV as
any vehicle that “has the capability to drive . . . without the active physical
control or monitoring by a human operator,” 76 but does not include
vehicles that only have collision avoidance systems. 77 Similar to the
Nevada regulation, 78 the “operator” is anyone who engages the vehicle or
71

FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85-16.86, 319.145 (2013); accord NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.

72

Compare FLA. STAT. § 319.145, with NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.080.

73

See FLA. STAT. § 316.85.

74

Id. § 316.86(2).

75

Damon Lavrinc, Autonomous Vehicles Now Legal in California, WIRED (Sept. 25,
2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/sb1298-signed-governor/.

76

CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2013).

77

VEH. § 38750(a)(2)(B). These include systems like blind spot assistance, automated
emergency braking systems and lane departure warning systems. Id.
78

NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.020 (2012).
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is in the driver’s seat. 79 Another provision explicitly states that “[t]he
driver shall be seated in the driver’s seat.” 80 The rest of the bill is fairly
similar to the Nevada legislation. 81
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN A WORLD WITH AVS
[16] With the growing discussion about AVs, many have speculated
about the potential legal and social effects likely to result. 82 Much of the
current discussion revolves around liability, either for the manufacturers or
for the operators of AVs. 83 Additionally, there is potential for Google and
similar companies to use the information gained from the “black-box”84
79

VEH. § 38750(a)(4).

80

Id. § 38750(b)(2). While this provision states that the law is not intended to allow for
AVs to be operated without the physical presence of a driver, section 38750(a)(4)
suggests it is only a matter of time before operation without a physically present driver
will be permissible. See id. § 38750(a)(4). Further, the statute states that the Department
of Motor Vehicles may impose additional requirements on a party seeking approval to
operate an AV without a physically present driver, suggesting this will be a possibility in
the future. See id. § 38750(e)(2).
81

Compare id. § 38750, with discussion supra Part I.B.1.

82

See generally Robert Peterson, New Technology–Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and
California’s Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341 (2012) (discussing
the effect AVs will have on the California insurance industry); Andrew P. Garza, Note,
“Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46
NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2011) (discussing the impact AVs may have on products liability
law); Susan Vogel, Driving the Future, SANTA CLARA L. MAG.,
http://law.scu.edu/sclaw/spring-2012-driving-the-future.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013)
(exploring liability, insurance, criminal tampering, and social challenges of autonomous
vehicles).
83

See generally Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues
Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157 (2012); Peterson,
supra note 82; Garza, supra note 82.
84

The Senate has recently passed a bill requiring Event Data Recorders or “black boxes”
in every car. See S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406 (2012). The black box tracks the
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for advertising purposes. 85 What has scarcely been mentioned, however,
is the impact AVs might have on law enforcement activity under the
Fourth Amendment with regards to drug-interdiction stops.86 To see more
clearly how AVs may change Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is
helpful first to look at Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it currently
stands.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Automobiles
[17] The Fourth Amendment provides safeguards for the public against
unreasonable government intrusion.87 Typically, courts have required
movements of the operators which could then be used to obtain information about what
advertising would be relevant for the AV operator.
85

Cf. Sarah Mitroff, Senate Passes Bill Requiring “Black Boxes” for Cars, But You May
Already Have One, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:14 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2012/04/19/black-boxes-for-cars/ (discussing black boxes and
privacy concerns).
86

See, e.g., Whorf, supra note 2 (explaining the process of drug-interdiction stops). See
generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1171 (2012) (discussing the various privacy concerns with regard to AVs beyond just the
Fourth Amendment).
87

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id. Daniel R. Dinger and John S. Dinger explain that “[a]t the time of its ratification, the
Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose was to protect ‘against the utilization of the ‘writs
of assistance’’ by the British. Over the years, however, it has evolved into an important
part of every citizen’s procedural rights against government intrusion into personal
affairs.” Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug Checkpoints and
Individual Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a Drug
Trafficking Conviction?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF
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officers to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate prior to entering a
home or conducting a search, 88 though the Supreme Court has stated that a
warrant is not required for all searches. 89 The Court has often reiterated
that one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a home is much greater
than one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile. 90 Unlike
homes, automobiles are subject to immense government regulation
because they operate on public roads and their interiors are more visible to
the public. 91 Nearly a century ago, the Court specifically addressed the
differences between the home and an automobile under the Fourth
Amendment in Carroll v. United States. 92 In Carroll, officers suspected
the petitioners of transporting alcohol, 93 and consequently stopped them
and searched their vehicle. 94 The Court held that even in the absence of a
valid search warrant, the police may make a search and seizure so long as
they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle was being used to
commit a crime. 95 The decision in Carroll introduced the Court’s
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1199-1200

(Johnny

H. Killian & George A. Constello eds., 1996)).
88

See United States v. Martinez, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1179 (D.N.M. 2009).

89

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925).

90

See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 153-54, 154 n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).
91

See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 154 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).

92

267 U.S. at 153.

93

During this time, the transportation of alcohol was prohibited by the Eighteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.

94

267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., concurring).

95

Id. at 156. The Court explained that “the seizing officer shall have reasonable or
probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has
contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. . . . In cases where the
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reluctance to equate the privacy afforded in the home and the privacy
afforded in an automobile. 96 Moreover, it gave the police greater
authority to conduct searches of automobiles by eliminating the need for a
neutral third party to verify that the officer had probable cause prior to the
search. 97
B. Challenging a Stop or Seizure
[18] Before looking at the different ways in which the police may
currently stop and search an automobile, it is essential to have a basic
understanding of who may make a Fourth Amendment challenge. The
Court generally finds that an individual has standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment challenge either when she has been seized 98 or when she has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area or item searched. 99 To
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, [however,] it must be used.” Id.; see also
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-95 (1985) (holding that a warrantless search of a
motor home based on probable cause was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
96

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

97

See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (abandoning the warrant requirement for a search of an
automobile based on probable cause).

98

See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) (holding that police seizure of a
passenger of a stopped automobile implicated the Fourth Amendment); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (stating that “stopping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitute[s] a ‘seizure’”).

99

See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 91 (1998) (using an apartment simply to
package cocaine does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (explaining that the defendant did not have a property interest
in the item seized and failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car in
which he was a passenger). In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan outlined a two part
test that is still being used by the courts. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a person must have both an expectation of privacy, and that
expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals has even refused to permit a passenger seized during a
traffic stop to challenge the constitutionality of a search because the passenger did not
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determine whether a seizure has occurred, the Court generally looks at the
totality of the circumstances to see if a reasonable person would feel free
to leave. 100 In some cases, a person may not feel free to leave for reasons
other than police presence, so the “free to leave” test is not appropriate in
all circumstances. 101 In those situations, the Court looks instead at
whether “a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” 102 Importantly, not every
encounter between the police and an individual amounts to a seizure or
stop under the Fourth Amendment. 103 For example, a casual encounter

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. United States v.
Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). So, a person seized may challenge the
constitutionality of the seizure, but not the search unless the person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched. See id. at 19.
100

See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (“We adhere to the view
that a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his
freedom of movement is restrained.”); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
626 (1991) (holding that the suspect was not seized when he ignored the officer’s show
of authority and continued running); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 690-92 (6th
Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant was seized when officers in a marked car
demanded he “stop” and “stay right there”).
101

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991) (explaining that in a situation
where the person does not intend to leave, determining whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave would not be an adequate test).
102

Id. at 436. In Bostick, officers boarded a bus on which the defendant was traveling
and requested to search the defendant’s luggage. Id. at 431-32. The Court determined
that he undoubtedly did not feel free to leave because he would ultimately be sacrificing
his luggage and bus ticket. Id. at 435-36. Thus, the Court found it inappropriate to apply
the free-to-leave test. Id. at 436. Still, the key for courts is to inquire into the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the event. Id. at 437; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 216, 219 (1984) (explaining that the Court should inquire into a reasonable person’s
freedom to decline an officers’ request when immigration officials question employees at
their workplace).
103

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
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with the police does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.104
Still, the Court has been clear that when the police stop a vehicle, the
driver is seized and entitled to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. 105
C. Stops and Subsequent Searches
[19] In Carroll, the Court dealt with the validity of the search of the
vehicle, not with the stop that preceded the search. 106 In general, probable
cause is necessary to search a vehicle once it has been stopped, but
reasonable suspicion is all that is needed to initially stop a vehicle. 107

104

See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011) (“[O]fficers may seek consentbased encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter
occurs.”); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (suggesting that drug-interdiction efforts do not
always implicate the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not violated simply by an officer approaching
a person and asking her questions); see also infra note 109 and accompanying text
(discussing the three different kinds of police encounters).

105

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). The Court in Brendlin explains that
“[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action
under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by means of physical force or authority,’
terminates or restrains his freedom of movement.” Id. at 254 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 434). For the purpose of this note, it is sufficient to understand that one is seized and
the Fourth Amendment is implicated simply by an officer stopping the vehicle. See, e.g.,
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (explaining that a checkpoint
constitutes a seizure); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment is implicated “because stopping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief.”) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)); see also Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257 (holding that a passenger is seized when
the vehicle in which he is riding is stopped).
106

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).

107

See generally United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that a stop of a
vehicle based on reasonable suspicion is permissible).
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1. Reasonable Suspicion Stops
[20] Even though a stop of an automobile implicates the Fourth
Amendment, in some instances reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard
than probable cause, is all the police need in the absence of a warrant. 108
The Court has classified police encounters in three different ways: casual
encounters, Terry stops, and arrests. 109 As the Court held in Terry v.
Ohio, 110 when an officer reasonably believes that “criminal activity may
be afoot,” the officer may make a reasonable inquiry to protect himself
and those around him. 111 Any action taken by the officer must be
108

See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 8 (1968).

109

United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1312 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that there are
three kinds of police-citizen encounters, (1) consensual encounters not based on any level
of suspicion, (2) stops under Terry, and (3) arrests). Unless otherwise noted, the term
“stop” throughout the rest of this note refers to a stop based on reasonable suspicion or
what have also been classified as Terry stops.
110

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

111

Id. at 30. More specifically the court held that
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial steps of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.

Id. In this case, Officer McFadden observed two men acting in what he considered to be
an odd way. Id. at 5. He explained that one man would leave the other, stop by a store to
look in the window, then walk a few more steps, turn and walk past again, pausing at the
same store. Id. at 6. McFadden noted that these two men took turns walking past the
store several times each. Id. at 6. Suspecting the men to be casing the store, he stopped
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reasonable based on the circumstances and limited in scope. 112
Reasonable suspicion and the subsequent seizure “must be based on
specific, objective facts” 113 that give the officer “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting” the person stopped was engaging in
criminal activity. 114 Courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to
determine if the reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied.115
Additionally, facts that might individually suggest innocent behavior may
amount to reasonable suspicion when aggregated. 116 Thus, since the
the men, asked their names, and then patted them down. See id. at 6-7. Officer
McFadden found a gun on two of the men, and they were both charged with carrying a
concealed weapon. Id. at 7. Agreeing that Officer McFadden did not have probable
cause to stop and frisk the two men, the Court nonetheless held that the officer’s actions
were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment since the seizure and the pat down were
reasonable and limited in scope. See id. at 19-20, 30. The initial rule was more focused
on police protection when police encounter individuals on the street, but has been
expanded to include traffic stops. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
112

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.

113

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).

114

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The Supreme Court has also
found that “some investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion of past criminal
activity could withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 227 (1985). Whether this requirement is actually used in practice is another
issue. David A. Harris suggests that while the Court reiterates this requirement, it does
not actually require it. David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment:
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower
Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 976 (1998) (“Even
though the Court’s rhetoric concerning the requirement of particularized suspicion stands,
almost unchanged, since 1968, lower courts have gradually but unmistakably eroded the
force of these words.”).
115

See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440,
443 (6th Cir. 2008)).
116

See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)) (“While certain facts, taken in isolation, may be
‘quite consistent with innocent travel,’ these facts may, in the aggregate, add up to
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inquiry is so heavily dependent on the specific facts of the case, there is no
clear set of rules that a court can apply to determine whether reasonable
suspicion is present in any given case. 117
[21] A decade after Terry, the Court held that stops of automobiles in
particular are unreasonable absent articulable reasonable suspicion that
there has been some violation of the law. 118 In Delaware v. Prouse, an
officer stopped the respondent’s vehicle simply to check his driver’s
license and registration; the officer lacked both probable cause and
reasonable suspicion to make the stop. 119 The Court recognized that
government interests may justify an intrusion on privacy, so the Court
must carefully balance the government’s interest in making stops with the
individual’s privacy interest. 120 Even though individuals are entitled to a

reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that behavior “susceptible to an innocent explanation when isolated from its
context may still give rise to reasonable suspicion when considered in light of all the
factors”).
117

See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)); see also infra notes 125-30
and accompanying text.
118

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); cf. State v. Butler, 539 S.E.2d 414, 416
(S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the police lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to
stop based solely on the presence of a paper temporary license plate on the vehicle).
119

See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (affirming defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of
marijuana possession because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant’s vehicle).
120

Id. at 656-57 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975));
see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”); State v. Rissley,
824 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the court “balances the
interests of the State in detecting, preventing, and investigating crime and the rights of
individuals to be free from unreasonable intrusions”) (quoting State v. Post, 733 N.W.2d
634, 638 (Wis. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

23

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

lesser protection in automobiles than in homes, 121 the Court stressed that
individuals “operating or traveling in an automobile [do] not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .” 122 Because the government can
achieve the same interest served by allowing stops to check for driver’s
licenses by making stops for observed violations, the Court held that the
government interest here did not justify the intrusion. 123
[22] What actually constitutes reasonable suspicion, upon which
officers can stop an automobile, is more difficult to understand. In United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that border patrol agents’ stops
based solely on the apparent ancestry of the occupants of the vehicle were
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 124 The Brignoni-Ponce
Court outlined several factors that officers can take into account when
establishing reasonable suspicion, including: the characteristics of the
area, the proximity to the border, normal traffic patterns on a given road,
the driver’s and occupant’s behavior, features of the vehicle, 125 and the

121

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

122

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662.

123

Id. at 659-61; cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83 (finding that the government’s
interest in limiting illegal immigration did not justify the use of roving patrols to make
stops based upon the apparent ethnicity of the occupants); infra notes 124-27 and
accompanying text.
124

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86 (finding that the respondents were stopped
because officers believed them to be illegal aliens based solely on “apparent Mexican
ancestry”); cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“The likelihood that in an area in which the majority—or even a substantial part—of the
population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone
an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the
reasonable suspicion calculus.”).
125

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85. The Court gave the example of a station wagon
with compartments that can be used to transport aliens or an unusually heavy load. Id. at
885; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (applying all of these
factors to conclude the agent had reasonable suspicion to make the stop).
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appearance of the occupants, 126 but not simply one’s race or ethnicity. 127
The totality-of-the-circumstances test enables courts and officers to use
their past experiences to infer that criminal activity may be afoot by
analyzing these and other factors present at the time of the stop or present
during prior investigations. 128

126

The Court noted that “officers can recognize characteristic appearance of persons who
live in Mexico, relying on such factors as mode of dress and haircut.” Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 885. This seems to be a distinction without a difference. The Court
essentially just re-characterized the factor to make it sound more politically correct.
127

Id. at 884-86. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that in general one’s
Hispanic appearance cannot be considered for reasonable suspicion. Montero-Camargo,
208 F.3d at 1132.
128

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (explaining that “[t]his process allows officers to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person’”
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))). Additionally, in United
States v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals methodically listed the factors it
took into account in determining that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2010). The court explained that the
following factors were present at the time of the stop:
(1) Johnson was in a high drug-trafficking area; (2) it was 4:00 a.m.; (3)
the officers were responding to a 911 call; (4) two or three minutes
after the 911 call, the officers observed Johnson twenty to thirty yards
from the blue Cadillac referenced in the call and near the residence
from which the call was made; (5) the officers did not notice anyone
else in the area, besides the driver of the white car to which Johnson
was headed; (6) Johnson did not stop when called to by the officers and
instead continued walking toward the white car; and (7) he was
carrying a bag, which he threw into the white car.
Id. at 692. The court went into a lengthy discussion about why it did not believe these
factors established reasonable suspicion, ultimately determining that “[t]he facts involved
here fall short of the constitutional standard.” Id. at 696. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court in Arvizu determined that the officer’s inference based on observable facts was
sufficient for reasonable suspicion. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
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2. Probable Cause to Search
[23] Once a vehicle has been stopped based either on probable cause129
or reasonable suspicion, officers must have probable cause in order to
conduct a search. 130 Probable cause is more than a “bare suspicion” that a
crime has been committed. 131 The traditional view is that probable cause
is established “[i]f the facts and circumstances before the officer are such
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has

129

Stops based on probable cause are not Terry stops. Still, officers can stop based on
probable cause because the lower standard of reasonable suspicion will, by definition, be
satisfied.
130

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1975) (“[W]e see no difference between on
the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”). In addition to stops based on reasonable suspicion, the police can pull
over automobiles based on probable cause. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 15556 (1925). Probable cause can be established simply by a driver breaking a traffic law.
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding that stops are
reasonable if an officer has probable cause to believe the driver violated a traffic law);
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Neb. 2006) (“[A] traffic violation, no matter
how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”); People v.
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that an officer who has probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has been committed may make a stop).
Establishing probable cause can sometimes be more certain than reasonable suspicion. In
most cases, officers stop vehicles following a traffic violation. Any traffic violation
establishes probable cause since a law has actually been broken. Thus, in most instances,
police can be more certain the stop will hold up if there is a traffic violation. Similarly,
because the standard for probable cause is higher than that for reasonable suspicion, if an
officer believes probable cause has been established, it is almost certain that she has
reasonable suspicion, so the stop should hold up. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
(1968) (explaining that reasonable suspicion can be established despite a lack of probable
cause). There are, however, several exceptions that allow officers to get into vehicles
absent probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found therein. See infra
notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
131

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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been committed.” 132 As with reasonable suspicion, 133 determining
probable cause is highly dependent on the facts, and the Court has avoided
issuing set rules on how it must be established. 134 Probable cause to
search is often based upon an officer sensing something when she
approaches the vehicle, 135 which then gives the officer some level of the
individualized suspicion required for a search to be reasonable. 136
[24] An initial stop based on reasonable suspicion can lead to a search
of the automobile based on probable cause. 137 Nevertheless, even if the
initial stop is based on probable cause after the driver was observed
132

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161.

133

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

134

See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”).
135

See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (explaining that probable
cause was established when the officer smelled burning opium); United States v. West,
219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that probable cause to search a bag in the
trunk of a vehicle was established after the officer smelled methamphetamine); Minnick
v. United States, 607 A.2d 519, 525 (D.C. 1992) (holding that an officer established
probable cause to search when he smelled a scent he associated with PCP).
136

See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.” (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997))); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that stopping a vehicle without reasonable suspicion is
a violation of the Fourth Amendment). The Court has recognized only limited situations
where this general rule does not apply. See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (allowing random drug testing of student-athletes); Nat’l Treasury
Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (allowing drug tests for some customs
officials).
137

See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1985) (explaining that the
stopping officer had reasonable suspicion based on a wanted flyer from another police
department, and that the subsequent search was based on probable cause after the officers
saw a gun in plain view).
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breaking a traffic law, the officer must further establish probable cause
that there is evidence of a crime in the vehicle before he can search. 138
This general rule is subject to several exceptions that allow officers to get
into vehicles for limited purposes without probable cause. 139 Courts have
permitted a limited search to determine ownership of a vehicle 140 or to
ensure the officer’s safety. 141 Similarly, the Court has validated searches
138

See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (“A rule that gives police the power to
conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense,
when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the
vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.”);
see also State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668-69 (Neb. 2006). In Voichahoske, an
officer stopped the vehicle for speeding. Id. Following the stop, the court found that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to continue investigating based on
the occupants behavior and lack of registration. Id. at 668-69. The officer summoned a
drug dog, and the dog alerted to the vehicle providing probable cause to search the
vehicle. See id. at 670-71. Thus, probable cause to search had to be established
independent of the probable cause to stop.
139

See Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d at 670 (“The warrantless search exceptions recognized
by this court include: (1) searches undertaken with consent or probable cause, (2)
searches under exigent circumstances, (3) inventory searches, (4) searches of evidence in
plain view, and (5) searches incident to a valid arrest.”).

140

See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235 (1968); United States v. Ferri, 357
F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Wis. 1973). The court in United States v. Lopez determined that
“at a minimum, an inquiry should be made by the officers as to the whereabouts of the
registration prior to the entry.” 474 F. Supp. 943, 948 (C.D. Cal. 1979). By comparison,
in Paschall v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court validated the search of a gym bag to find
the vehicle registration despite no further inquiry by the officer about the possible
location of the registration. 523 N.E.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Ind. 1988). However, the court
found the subsequent search of a suitcase to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment
absent a warrant since the identification exception was no longer applicable. Id. at 1362.
141

See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (“The balancing required by Terry
clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger
compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively
reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.”). The Court has also
permitted a limited search of the driver. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111-12 (1977) (permitting a search of a driver after the officer noticed a bulge on the
person); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (permitting an officer to reach
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incident to arrest 142 and seizures of items found in plain view. 143 Still, a
further search of the vehicle’s compartments, like the trunk, must be based
on probable cause to believe contraband will be found therein.144
Establishing probable cause to conduct a further search and determining
the scope of that search are dependent on whether the officer has probable
cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched. 145

into a vehicle and grab the suspect’s weapon after an informant told the officer where it
was located).
142

See Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. Searches incident to arrest must be limited in scope. Id.
(holding that officer can search incident to arrest so long as they reasonably believe
“evidence of the offense of [the] arrest might be found in the vehicle”); see also United
States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
143

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-69 (1971) (permitting the police
to seize an item found in plain view so long as the discovery was inadvertent).

144

See Jackson, 415 F.3d at 91. Once an officer may search the trunk, though, that
officer may search any containers inside the trunk. Id. at 91-92; see also United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

145

See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (explaining that the scope of a warrantless automobile
search is limited by “the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found,” rather than by “the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted”);
see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1982) (holding that police may
conduct warrantless searches of containers in automobiles so long as they have probable
cause to believe contraband will be contained therein). Establishing probable cause to
search both a container or the trunk and the passenger compartment is dependent on the
likelihood that evidence of the crime would be found in the container or the trunk. See
Jackson, 415 F.3d at 91-93 (rejecting the government’s argument that the officers had
probable cause to search for contraband in the trunk because they found stolen tags on the
outside of the vehicle). The Jackson court differentiated that case from other cases where
there were more “empirical connection[s]” between discovery in the passenger
compartment and the presence of additional contraband in the trunk. Id. at 93 (citing
United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also United States v.
Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (permitting the search of the trunk after the
officer established probable cause that marijuana was contained in the vehicle and could
be contained in the trunk).
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D. Consent to Search
[25] Officers can avoid establishing probable cause to search if they can
obtain valid consent to search. 146 A warrantless entry and search of an
automobile, or even a home, does not violate the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 147 as long as the
officer obtains the consent of the owner whose property is to be searched
prior to conducting the search. 148 If the owner is not present, a third party
who has access to the area 149 and “common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises” may give valid consent to a
search. 150 Any consent given, though, must be free and voluntary. 151
146

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). See generally Tracey
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008) (discussing consent searches); Whorf, supra note 2.

147

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

148

See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248;
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
149

See United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992) (permitting the owner of
the locker in which the defendant had stored items to consent to a search).
150

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). The Court explained that
common authority depends on the
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any
of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection . . . and that
the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched.
Id. at 172 n.7.
151

See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (holding that officers do not need to tell the detainee that he or
she is “free to go” before his consent to search is recognized); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)) (explaining that the
prosecution has the burden of establishing consent was “freely and voluntarily given”).
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Additionally, the consent of a third party who in fact does not possess
authority to consent is valid as long as the officers reasonably believe the
person has authority to consent. 152 Lastly, the validity of a minor’s
consent is still being debated in the courts, but courts have held that the
Fourth Amendment protections apply to minors. 153 The Supreme Court
has yet to decide the issue of minor consent to search automobiles, but
some lower courts have found that minors have authority to consent to
searches, at least it some circumstances. 154 In any case, the request for
consent cannot delay the stop itself. 155 Some courts have further limited
the scope of consent inquiries, holding that it must be related to the traffic

The Court determines voluntariness based on the totality of the circumstances to ensure
the consent was not the “product of duress or coercion.” Id. at 227. The Court noted that
it is not necessary for police to inform a party of his or her right to refuse consent, though
such knowledge can be taken into account. Id. Lastly, the Court noted a need to balance
the “legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring
the absence of coercion.” Id. Additionally, consent must be more than just acquiescence
to a lawful authority. Id. at 233; see also United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723,
727 (2d Cir. 1973).
152

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89; Maclin, supra note 146, at 43-44.

153

See, e.g., Abdella v. O’Toole, 343 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135, 137 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting
that a minor’s authority to consent has not been decided, but courts should consider the
possibility that minor may be more easily coerced); Kristin Henning, The Fourth
Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 61 (2011).
154

E.g., Lenz v. Winburm, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1995) (permitting a
minor to consent to a GAL search of a bedroom); United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775,
778 (6th Cir. 1990) (permitting the defendant’s fourteen and twelve-year-old children to
consent to a search of their home). Contra United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d
411, 415-16 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding the twelve-year-old son of the defendant lacked
authority to consent to a search of the father’s bedroom); People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757,
759 (Cal. 1987) (holding that an eleven-year-old’s consent to search the child’s home was
invalid); State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006) (invalidating a search
pursuant to a thirteen-year-old’s consent to search the child’s home).
155

See State v. Johnson, 51 P.3d 1112, 1116-17 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
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stop and supported by some kind of reasonable suspicion. 156 Consent
nevertheless gets officers into many vehicles, but the process may be
affected by AVs in the future.
III. SO WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AVS?
[26] According to the Department of Justice, people most often
encounter the police during traffic stops. 157 Professor Wayne R. LaFave
explains that since drivers cannot travel a significant distance without
breaking some traffic law, “virtually anyone (even a Supreme Court
Justice) can readily be stopped” based on probable cause. 158 AVs,
however, can do just that; AVs are designed to abide by all traffic laws.
Thus, the ability of the police to stop just anyone will presumably be
significantly lessened with the introduction of AVs into our society. For
the most part, current AV regulation does not allow for vehicles to be
operated without a physically present operator, 159 but the text of the
legislation and reports from the industry suggest that the goal is to have
AVs be fully operational without a physically present operator. 160 Thus,
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to AVs, both with and without
156

See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn. 2003).

157

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Traffic Stops, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702.
158

Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (2004)
(citing B. James George, Jr., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 65 (1969)).
159

See supra notes 68, 81, and accompanying text. But see NEV. ADMIN. CODE §
482A.030 (2012) (permitting the operation of AVs without an operator being physically
present only if a certificate of compliance has been issued).
160

See Nissan Motor Company, Nissan Announces Unprecedented Autonomous Drive
Benchmarks, NISSANNEWS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://nissannews.com/enUS/nissan/usa/releases/nissan-announces-unprecedented-autonomous-drive-benchmarks;
supra notes 66, 76, 80, and accompanying text.
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a physically present operator, will likely be at the forefront of debate
within the next several years.
A. Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause when AVs Rule
the Road
[27] Establishing reasonable suspicion to stop an AV may be more
difficult than establishing reasonable suspicion to stop a traditional
vehicle. Reasonable suspicion is generally found in one of three ways.
The first is by prior extrinsic observation, meaning officers conduct an
outside investigation that increases their suspicion of a certain individual
and vehicle without necessarily relying on the behavior of the individual at
the time of the stop. 161 The second way reasonable suspicion can be found
is by receiving information from a tipster, 162 and the third way is by police
officers’ observations of the driver at the time of the search. 163 The latter
161

See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1981). This kind of
observation generally takes place sometime before the stop. This type of reasonable
suspicion is typically established based on an outside investigation and is largely
independent from the observations at the time of the stop. For example, in Cortez,
Border Patrol officers found recurring footprints of eight to twenty people in an area near
the border, with one distinctive set of prints that were always present. Id. at 413. Based
on the path of the prints and the times when they were found, officers deducted that the
group was traveling at night and on the weekends. Id. Based on this information and the
officers’ experience with illegal immigration in the area, they predicted that a group
would be coming through on a particular weekend. Id. at 414. The officers waited for a
vehicle that would be capable of transporting a group of aliens and that was driving in the
pattern they had predicted it would. Id. at 414-15. Based on this information, the officers
stopped the defendant’s vehicle and found the illegal aliens. Id. at 415. The Court held
that the stop was constitutional, stressing the officers’ knowledge of the area and the
practices of illegal aliens. Id. at 421-22.
162

See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990); Flemister v. State, 732 S.E.2d
810, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (determining the reasonable suspicion requirement was
satisfied based on the officers’ observations following a tip from a confidential
informant).
163

See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 269-71 (2002). In Arvizu, an officer
observed a driver on a rural road near the Mexican border where smugglers often try to
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will not be possible when an AV is operated in autonomous mode without
a physically present operator for obvious reasons. However, the first issue
the Court will likely face is a stop of an AV, operating in autonomous
mode, with an operator in the vehicle. Since AVs are designed to abide by
all relevant traffic laws, the stop will not likely have been based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver broke a traffic
law. 164 So, as has been done, the officer will have to rely on things like
the behavior of the operator, the characteristics of the vehicle, the route
taken by the vehicle, and the area in which the vehicle is located to
establish reasonable suspicion to make a spontaneous stop, as the Court
did in United States v. Arvizu. 165 The factors relevant to establish
reasonable suspicion to stop AVs should not be very different from the
current factors addressed by the courts where reasonable suspicion has
been found. 166 One exception, however, is the officer’s ability to consider
erratic or unusual driving patterns. For example, in United States v.
Baskin, the officer established the requisite reasonable suspicion to make
avoid permanent checkpoints. Id. at 269-70. In addition to the location of the vehicle,
the officer took into account the driver and passenger’s odd behavior, including the kids’
raised knees as if they had something under their feet and their strange waves, in
determining he had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Id. at 270-71, 277-78.
164

See supra Part I.A. Of course, if a law was broken, the officers would immediately
have probable cause to make the stop as with a traditional automobile. See United States
v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994); State v. Lee, 658 N.W.2d 669, 676
(Neb. 2003) (“It is well established that a traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates
probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.”). Similarly, officers will still be able to
stop for a burned out headlight or other similar maintenance issue.
165

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 88485 (1975); State v. Cure, 93 So. 3d 1268, 1270 (La. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that
reasonable suspicion was established based on the defendant’s behavior and the vehicle’s
location in a high-crime area). This analysis should not be different from the court’s
current analysis of reasonable suspicion with automobiles since the officers will be able
to consider the driver’s behavior. The issue changes even more when officers are unable
to take into account a person’s behavior and facial expressions.
166

See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing the factors appropriate for
courts to consider).
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the stop based on the driver’s sudden acceleration upon seeing the officer
near a meth lab. 167 The driver reacted to an outside stimulus, causing him
to change his method of driving without breaking the law. 168 An AV
operating in autonomous mode will not react to outside stimuli in the way
the driver in Baskin did, so to that extent officers may have one less factor
upon which to rely in establishing reasonable suspicion. It is still possible,
though, for the driver to disengage autonomous mode. 169 In that situation,
this factor may retain its relevance with regard to AVs with a physically
present operator.
[28] While that analysis should remain largely unchanged, establishing
reasonable suspicion to stop an AV operating without a physically present
driver will be different. Under these conditions, the officer will have even
less upon which to establish reasonable suspicion to make the stop, though
it should still be possible for an officer to develop the requisite
particularized suspicion using either prior extrinsic observations or
tipsters. Obtaining reasonable suspicion through these mechanisms is
more difficult than traditional drug-interdiction stops. Currently, many
drug-interdiction stops are based on observable circumstances
immediately before the stop. 170 Without a physically present operator, the
police cannot observe the behavior of the operator. Similarly, when AVs
are operated in autonomous mode, some other immediate observations like
167

401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005).

168

Id.

169

CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(A), (D) (West 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§
482A.110(2)(c), 482A.190(2)(b), (g) (2012).
170

See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that reasonable
suspicion was established based on the location of the vehicle and observations of the
driver and passengers immediately before the stop); United States v. Farnell, 701 F.3d
256, 262 (8th Cir. 2012) (establishing reasonable suspicion from an officer’s observation
of a driver who matched the description of a “be on the look-out” report and who
shielded his face when the officer drove by); Cure, 93 So. 3d at 1270-72 (holding that
reasonable suspicion was established after the officer observed the behavior of the
defendant).
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the route taken or even the neighborhood where the vehicle is being
operated may be less indicative of criminal activity. 171 When the AV
takes control of the navigation of the vehicle and the route taken, these
factors may simply be indicative of the programming of the vehicle, rather
than an indication that criminal activity may be afoot. That is not to say
that the location of the vehicle and route taken will become completely
irrelevant, but the weight given to those factors should be reduced in many
instances. 172 That being the case, police departments may need to increase
the amount of drug investigations they are conducting in order to maintain
the number of drug-interdiction stops they make, as they will be more
reliant on prior extrinsic observation and tipsters.
[29] As a result, the government will quickly request the Court to
increase its authority to stop AVs because of the government’s heightened
interest in preventing drug trafficking and its inability to conduct
additional investigations. Currently, drug-interdiction stops account for a
significant amount of drug seizures and drug arrests. 173 Routine traffic
stops allow police to get one step closer to making a formal search of the
171

Typically, courts find a vehicle’s presence in a “high-crime” or “high drugtrafficking” area to be particularly relevant in determining whether an officer has
reasonable suspicion. Harris, supra note 114, at 998. These factors, however, allow the
court to use racial and ethnic stereotypes to establish reasonable suspicion, resulting in
many more stops of minority populations. Prohibiting officers from using these two
factors would help reduce the amount of racial and ethnic stereotyping, thereby equating
the privacy awarded to all populations. See id. at 997-98; Margaret Raymond, Down on
the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 112 (1999). See generally
Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction
Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2004) (discussing how race is used in
determining whether to stop a vehicle and how problematic that can be).
172

Anecdotal evidence suggests that GPS navigation systems frequently take drivers on
routes the driver may not have chosen on his or her own. The value of an officer’s
observation that an AV is in a “high-crime” area is substantially lessened if the operator
has not chosen the route.
173

See generally Whorf, supra note 2.
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vehicle. By restricting routine stops, the government arguably loses an
important mechanism to prevent illegal drug use and trafficking. In
Prouse, the Court explained that because alternative mechanisms for
ensuring safety on the roads existed, the stop just to check a driver’s
license and registration was overly intrusive. 174 That might not be the
case with drug-interdiction stops if the police are restricted from stopping
AVs because of the nature of the vehicles. If stops are more restricted, the
police will arguably be losing a significant mechanism for ensuring drugs
remain off the street. As a result, the government will likely suggest that
stops of AVs without a traffic violation are reasonable and necessary. The
government’s argument loses some traction, though, because of the
possibility of conducting stops based on reasonable suspicion obtained
from prior extrinsic observation and from tipsters. 175 In reality, the police
still have a significant mechanism to ensure this government interest is
met without interfering with individuals’ privacy.
[30] Not only will the police retain a mechanism for stopping AVs, the
police will still be able to establish probable cause to search AVs without
a physically present operator in almost the same way they currently
establish probable cause to search. Once the vehicle is stopped, the police
must establish probable cause to search the vehicle or obtain consent to
search from the driver. 176 The police often establish probable cause to
search based on the actions of the driver, smells emanating from the

174

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). The government tried to argue that it
should be allowed to make stops solely for the purpose of checking the driver’s license
and registration to ensure safety on the roads, but the Court rejected that argument. Id. at
658-59. The Court said it was “unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway
safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
at 659.
175

See supra Part III.A.

176

See infra Part III.B (discussing consent to search).
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vehicle, or observations of the inside of the vehicle. 177 Officers will still
be able to speak directly with a physically present operator of an AV if the
vehicle is stopped, and the officer will still be able to ask the operator
basic investigatory questions. 178 Again, the current “probable cause to
search” analysis will remain unchanged in that scenario. When AVs are
operated without a physically present operator, however, the police will be
restrained from speaking with the operator. 179 As a result, the police may
be slightly hindered in establishing probable cause to search. Still, officers
can establish probable cause based on scents emanating from the vehicle
or based on a signal from a drug-detection dog. 180 If the contraband being
transported has a pungent odor, the officer could still establish probable
cause just as easily as he would with a traditional vehicle. Likewise, the
numerous exceptions to the probable cause requirement would enable the
officer to search in many situations. 181 For example, if the trafficker failed
177

See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 259-61 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that
probable cause to search was satisfied when the officer saw an open bottle of alcohol in
the vehicle); State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 633 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that “the smell of
burnt marijuana, in combination with other circumstances, leads to law enforcement
officers’ possession of probable cause to search the entirety of the motor vehicle”); State
v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the smell of burnt marijuana
helped established probable cause to search the entire vehicle).
178

See State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Neb. 2006) (explaining that
following a traffic stop for speeding, an officer may ask the driver for his or her license
and registration, may ask about the purpose of the driver’s travel, may run a search for
outstanding warrants, and may ask the passengers other similar routine questions); see
also State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting the officer’s
questions regarding the driver’s final destination, but not the further suspicionless
extension of the stop after the driver refused to consent to a search).

179

If, however, the AV manufacturers install a program to contact the operator at the time
of the stop, the officer would still be able to speak with and question the operator. See
infra note 189 and accompanying text.
180

See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text (discussing drug-detection dog sniffs).

181

See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the various exceptions to
probable cause).
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to conceal of the product, the officer would have authority to search based
on the contraband being in plain view. 182 In the situation where a
trafficker creates a special enclosed compartment to house the drugs
within the AV, plain view and likely scent will not be helpful. In that
situation, the officer may be unable to establish probable cause absent a
drug-detection dog or prior extrinsic observation. 183 Still, all it would take
to establish probable cause to conduct a search would be a signal from a
drug dog. 184 Thus, AVs being operated without a physically present
driver should not result in much, if any, additional restriction on the ability
of the police to establish probable cause to search a vehicle. Any
additional restriction on the police is already remedied by the numerous
automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.
B. Consensual Searches and AVs
[31] If an officer cannot immediately establish probable cause to search,
police can often get authority to search vehicles by consent of the

182

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (holding that the seizure of evidence
found in plain view does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even absent inadvertence).
183

If the stop itself were based on information obtained during prior extrinsic
observation, the officer may have enough to make a search as well. Whether that is the
case will be dependent upon the extent of suspicion obtained; in other words, whether or
not the stop was based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Still, it might be the
case that the prior extrinsic observation was accompanied with a tip that established
reasonable suspicion to stop. Probable cause might then be established if the officers
further corroborate part of the tip upon examining the exterior of the vehicle. See, e.g.,
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (holding that an anonymous tip later
corroborated was enough to establish reasonable suspicion to make a stop); United States
v. Jones, 700 F.3d 615, 622 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that “a tip predicting future
behavior, not known to the general public, may be worthy of significant weight to the
extent that it demonstrates that the informant has some inside information or familiarity
with the defendant’s affairs” thereby giving the officer probable cause to search).
184

See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); United States v.
Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363
(10th Cir. 1989).
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driver. 185 Police frequently request to search during routine traffic
stops. 186 Of those who are asked to consent, most do. 187 Consent searches
are becoming part of routine traffic stops and are unreasonably
interrupting the travels of drivers, regardless of their culpability in any
kind of criminal activity. 188 The Court has not specifically authorized an
operator who is not physically present to consent and has not addressed
whether an officer’s reliance on that consent would be reasonable. One
possible solution to this issue is for the AV manufacturers to create a
method for immediately contacting the operator in the event of a stop.189
For example, the AV could send the operator a message as soon as the

185

See supra Part II.D.

186

See LaFave, supra note 158, at 1852, 1891-92.

187

Id. at 1891. LaFave further cites a study that found approximately ninety percent of
people consent to a search when one is requested by an officer. Id. at 1891 n.274 (citing
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 533-35 (2001)). When faced with the authority of the police,
many are willing to sacrifice their rights without thinking twice. See, e.g., Tatum Ryan,
White Lake Man Stopped at Gunpoint During Search for I-96 Shooter, HARTLANDPATCH
(Oct. 29, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://brighton.patch.com/articles/local-man-searched-forweapons-on-way-to-work (discussing an incident where an innocent man was stopped
and forced out of his vehicle at gun point based on nothing more than reasonable
suspicion). Following the event the man explained he “was completely fine with what
they did.” Id.
188

LaFave, supra note 158, at 1891, 1893.

189

For example, the operator could be required to input a contact number before engaging
the vehicle; that number could be obtained by the officer scanning a code on the vehicle.
This might unconstitutionally delay the stop, though, if the police cannot get a hold of the
operator for whatever reason. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, it could be required that the operator be available whenever the vehicle is engaged.
Of course, this assumes that the court will accept consent obtained over the Internet or by
phone.
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vehicle has been stopped by the police, 190 and the operator could either
approve or refuse the search. 191 This procedure would ensure the police
maintain their ability to request a consensual search.
[32] The government could also argue that AV owners, by virtue of
their ownership and licensing of the vehicles, provide implied consent to
police searches following a lawful stop when operating their vehicles in
autonomous mode on state roads. Currently, many states have implied
consent statutes that provide that a person driving on state highways has
impliedly consented to blood, breath, urine, or saliva tests when a driver
has been arrested for operating under the influence and the officer had
reasonable grounds to believe such offense was committed prior to the
arrest. 192 These implied consent statutes for intoxication require enough
evidence to make an arrest. 193 The correlative standard for AVs without a
physically present driver would be enough information to establish
probable cause to arrest the operator for trafficking drugs. 194 If the officer
190

This mechanism could also be used to help the officer establish probable cause to
search, which is another reason why the government’s power under the Fourth
Amendment should not be extended. See Part II.A (discussing probable cause to search
an AV without a physically present driver).
191

The Court would still need to approve this method of consent.

192

See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13384 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1) (2013);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-55, 40-5-67.1 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.020 (2013); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 484C.150-484C.160 (2012). Federal law contains a similar provision
applicable to persons who operate a vehicle “in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3118 (2006). Some states provide even
less protection of drivers with commercial driver’s licenses. See, e.g., Robinson v. Kan.
Dep’t. of Revenue, 154 P.3d 508, 510-11 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a driver’s
commercial driver’s license could be suspended for refusal to consent without specific
notice of such even when the driver was driving a non-commercial vehicle at the time of
the stop).
193

See supra note 192 and accompanying text.

194

This correlative standard does not fit this situation seamlessly. Any stop of the AV
based on probable cause to arrest the operator would be speculative, at best, because the
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could establish probable cause to arrest without a physically present
driver, it is likely the officer would also have probable cause to believe
evidence of the crime was contained within the vehicle. 195 Thus, the
officer would have authority to search since an officer with probable cause
to search can search without a warrant, 196 so the directly analogous
principle would only be marginally applicable. The alternative would
require a legislature to pass a statute requiring AV operators who intend to
operate the vehicle without a physically present operator to give implied
consent to all searches. While such a statute might solve the problem of
obtaining consent, it would most likely, as it should, be found to be an
unreasonable and unconstitutional intrusion. 197 Such a provision would
essentially permit the government to have unrestricted access to AVs. It is
improbable that the Court would accept such a provision since the Court
has refused to find that an individual loses all Fourth Amendment
protection when operating a vehicle. Similarly, given the extensive search
exceptions for automobiles already in place, any further extension would
be unreasonable and unnecessary. 198
officer could have no way of knowing for certain that the one for whom he has probable
cause to arrest is actually operating the AV. It seems more likely that the officer would
have probable cause to believe that the AV in question was involved in the trafficking
operation. Thus, the most likely situation would be that the officer has probable cause to
believe contraband would be found within the AV, giving the officer authority to search.
195

Likely, the officer would have probable cause to arrest based on an investigation of
the operator of the vehicle and his drug trafficking scheme. If that is so, the officer
would also have probable cause to believe that contraband would be found within the
AV, and the officer could search based on that.
196

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-57 (1925).

197

See, e.g., Ohio v. Mesley, 732 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“The Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable government intrusions, whether a search or a
seizure, into areas of recognized privacy expectations.”) (citations omitted).
198

Current automobile exceptions have eliminated the warrant requirement, permitted
searches incident to arrest, tolerated limited searches for weapons, and allowed limited
searches to determine the identity of the operator. See supra notes 140-43 and
accompanying text.
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[33] Additionally, the Supreme Court has already validated dog sniffs
of vehicles lawfully stopped, as long as the sniff does not unreasonably
prolong the stop itself. 199 The use of drug dogs may eliminate the consent
issue in most situations. A signal from a drug-detection dog is all the
officer needs to establish probable cause to search the entire vehicle. 200
Thus, if the police instituted a policy of sniffing all AVs lawfully stopped,
they could potentially get into any vehicle carrying contraband, without
regard to consent. 201 The biggest problem for the state would be ensuring
the stop is not prolonged any more than is necessary to investigate the
purpose of the stop. A stop and the subsequent questioning or detention
must be reasonably related in scope to the reason for the stop. 202 Because
drug dogs are often not readily available and obtaining one may prolong

199

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining that “an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop” and that “the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available”); see also United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916-17
(8th Cir. 1994) (finding the stop was not unreasonably prolonged when the officer and
the suspect had to wait an hour for a drug dog). When stops become “unreasonably
prolonged” is somewhat unclear. In United States v. Sharpe, the Court permitted a
twenty-minute detention while the parties waited for a drug dog. 470 U.S. 675, 687-88
(1985). The Court noted that the only behavior that extended the length of the detention
was the driver’s evasive actions when the officers tried to stop him. Id. Similarly, in
United States v. Bloomfield, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals validated a detention of
one hour because the officer took immediate action to obtain a drug dog. Bloomfield, 40
F.3d at 916-17. In United States v. Place, by contrast, the Court found an airplane
traveler’s detention for ninety minutes while waiting for a drug dog to be unreasonable
because almost the entire length of the detention was the result of police incompetence.
462 U.S. 696, 708-10 (1983). Accordingly, the inquiry seems to hinge on how quickly
and reasonably the officers act and less upon how quickly the dog is actually procured.
200

See, e.g., Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 919; United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th
Cir. 1989).
201

Likewise, the other automobile exceptions are still available to police if a drug dog
cannot be obtained. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
202

See supra note 178 and accompanying text.

43

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 1

the stop, 203 and because the other exceptions do not apply in all
circumstances, the consent issues will still need to be addressed if the
government is to have authority to obtain consent to search an AV. The
best option is for the AV manufacturers to include a mechanism for
obtaining consent 204 and for legislatures to require AVs operators who are
not physically present to be available to consent via the mechanism
created by the AV manufacturers. This would ensure the officer has the
opportunity to obtain consent, thereby ensuring the government retains its
ability to conduct consent searches when a drug dog is not readily
available. Similarly, this would guarantee the individuals’ privacy and
ability to refuse a search is protected. The interests of both parties would
be protected and balanced similar to the way they are currently
balanced. 205
[34] If the operator can somehow consent without being present, or an
implied consent statute is permitted, the problem becomes ensuring the
search is limited to the consent obtained. Conversely, if the operator does
not consent, there is an issue of ensuring the police do not move forward
with the search anyway. These problems could easily be remedied by the
AV manufacturer installing interior cameras accessible from the device
used to operate the vehicle. Further, AV owners may want to send their
AV to daycare to pick up a child, or send the AV to take the child to
football practice. Currently, it is not settled whether consent of a minor is
203

See, e.g., Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 (“When police need the assistance of a drug dog
in roadside Terry stops, it will in general take time to obtain one; local government police
forces and the state highway patrol cannot be expected to have drug dogs immediately
available to all officers in the field at all times.”).
204

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.

205

Arguably, much of the feared coercion possible during a stop of a traditional vehicle
may be gone because the operator may be less likely to submit to the officer’s show of
authority while she is sitting on her couch waiting for her AV to arrive. Cf. Rebecca
Strauss, We Can Do This the Easy Way Or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce
Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 882, 886-87 (2002) (discussing coercion in
the context of consent searches).
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sufficient. 206 The current trend in the lower courts is to permit a minor to
consent in some instances, but these cases have dealt specifically with a
minor’s authority to consent to the search of the home in which the child
resides. 207 The applicability of these cases to consent to search an AV is
unclear. 208 The Court could find that if the child is frequently left with
exclusive control of the AV, meaning the child is often left to travel in the
AV alone, or if the adult operator permits the child to consent, then the
child may be able to consent to a search. 209 On the other hand, if the
“degree of access” the child has to the car is limited, the child’s ability to
consent may likewise be limited. 210 Thus, if the minor is given frequent
exclusive control of the AV, the consent of a minor should be permissible
if the minor has the capacity to weigh the issues at hand. For example, a
fifteen-year-old may be able to contemplate and understand the
consequences of permitting the search and the consequences of denying
the search. On the other hand, a five-year-old probably would not.
Further, to ensure consent of a minor is freely and voluntarily given and to
dispel much of the concern for coercion, the police should be advised to
inform the minor of her right to decline the officer’s request to search.
206

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

207

See supra note 154 and accompanying text; Henning, supra note 153, at 72-73
(explaining that the courts that have heard the issue have held that minors have the right
to challenge searches of their living spaces). The ability of minors to challenge searches
suggests they also have the authority to initially consent to such a search.
208

A child’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the home in which she resides is more
easily established than the child’s reasonable expectation of privacy in her mother’s AV
since the child likely stores personal belongings and other intimate things in the home
while the same cannot likely be said for the AV.
209

See, e.g., United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990) (permitting the
defendant’s fourteen and twelve-year-old children to consent to a search of their home
because the children were frequently left in exclusive control of the home).
210

See United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(differentiating this case from Clutter because there was no showing that the children
were ever given exclusive control of the home).
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The Court, though, should establish a workable standard to determine
when consent of a minor is sufficient.
IV. HOW FAR SHOULD THE COURT EXTEND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?
[35] It appears the government may be able to stop and search AVs
based on probable cause and reasonable suspicion, with slight, if any, shift
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Yet, the question remains whether
the Court should enable the government to conduct these searches on AVs
and whether the Court should extend the Fourth Amendment to
accommodate the government. The current test and precedent for the
Fourth Amendment is “arbitrary and unpredictable.” 211 It is not clear to
officers, individuals, or even the courts when reasonable suspicion or
probable cause has been established. 212 Additionally, the more the Court
extends the government’s power under the Fourth Amendment and the
211

David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding
Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 56 (2005); see also Phyllis T. Bookspan,
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 473, 474-75 (1991) (“Current search and seizure doctrine is inconsistent and
incoherent. No one, including the police who are to abide by it, judges who apply it, or
the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful sense of what the law is.”).
212

Courts have even acknowledged that there cannot be a set of rules to determine these
cases, which suggests that the determinations made by the courts are based more on who
the judge is than what the standard ought to be. See supra notes 117, 134 and
accompanying text. Similarly, courts do not always understand the distinction between
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. For example, in State v. Lloyd the court
conflated the two terms by saying the officer had reasonable suspicion to initially
approach the vehicle when the officer actually had probable cause since the officer’s
subsequent search had to have been based on probable cause and the same facts that
supported the “reasonable suspicion” supported the probable cause for the search. 263
P.3d 557, 563-69 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). The court said, “[n]evertheless, this seizure was
constitutional because the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for a
brief investigation. Because there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained contraband, i.e., crack cocaine [the officer] had authority to ‘search [the]
automobile and the containers within it.’” Id. at 568 (first and second emphasis added)
(footnote omitted) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).
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more ambiguous the test, the less privacy individuals can retain. On the
other hand, increasing the government’s power under the Fourth
Amendment may help legitimize our laws by enabling the police to
enforce drug laws, human trafficking laws, and immigration laws.
Ultimately, though, individuals’ privacy interests in their vehicles must
take priority over the government’s interest in detecting contraband.
[36] Proponents of increased government power might suggest that as
AVs become more prevalent, the risk that people will use their AVs to
transport illegal drugs or to engage in other illegal activities will grow
simply because of ease. Some members of the Court have recognized the
need to evolve the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as technology
evolves. 213 Our federal government currently spends approximately $2.6
billion on enforcing drug laws. 214 Not only is the cost of policing and
restricting illegal drug use high, but the societal costs of drug use are also
great. 215 An estimated $200 to $250 billion is necessary to handle needed
drug treatment costs throughout the world. 216 Additionally, an estimated
213

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(suggesting the Court should account for evolving technology like GPS in making its
Fourth Amendment determinations regarding one’s expectation of privacy).

214

Rob Reuteman, The Cost-and-Benefit Arguments Around Enforcement, CNBC, (April
20, 2010 12:03 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36600923/The_CostandBenefit_Arguments_Around_Enforceme
nt. In 2009, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s budget was $2.6 billion. Id. In addition, at
least eight states spend more than one billion dollars on drug enforcement annually. Id.
Those states are New York, Texas, California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. Id. Granted, some argue that by reducing the restrictions on drugs we can
reduce the amount spent enforcing such laws; however, that discussion is beyond the
scope of this note.
215

See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2012, at 4
(2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf (discussing societal costs such as
negative health consequences, decreased productivity, and heavy financial burden).
216

Id. at 4. These costs can include rudimentary drug treatment programs, but it can also
be the result of medical costs related to HIV, which affects three million drug users
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0.9% of gross domestic product is sacrificed to productivity losses within
the market place associated with drug abuse in the United States. 217 This
illustrates that drug abuse and trafficking continues to be a problem in
countless facets of our society. As such, the government arguably has an
increasing interest, both financial and social, in limiting drug use and drug
trafficking. Permitting the use of AVs without much ability to stop and
search them will likely result in an increase in the amount of money spent
on policing drugs. Some may argue that these growing numbers tip the
scale in favor of the government. 218 As a result, some may say that
despite the ability of officers to stop AVs under the current law, the Court
ought to extend the Fourth Amendment to permit stops of AVs more
frequently and more easily. 219
[37] While drug abuse and use has significant financial and societal
costs, 220 the cost of individual freedom is much greater. The Supreme
worldwide, or hepatitis B and C, which together affect approximately 9.7 million drug
users. Id. at 7.
217

Id. at 4.

218

The Court has typically held that the government interest in policing general crime
control does not outweigh the individual’s privacy interest. See City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (invalidating a checkpoint for illegal drugs because it
furthered no interest beyond general crime control).
219

The effectiveness of increased drug enforcement to cut other crime has been highly
debated. See Bruce L. Benson et al., The Impact of Drug Enforcement on Crime: An
Investigation of the Opportunity Cost of Police Resources, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 989, 98990 (2001), available at http://jod.sagepub.com/content/31/4/989.refs [hereinafter Is
Property Crime Caused by Crime]. Some authors suggest that increased drug
enforcement reduces the police resources to enforce other laws, which ultimately results
in an increase in property and violent crimes. See generally Bruce L. Benson et al., Is
Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or by Drug Enforcement Policy?, 24 APPLIED
ECON. 679 (1992). But see generally The Impact of Drug Enforcement on Crime, supra
(rebutting this argument). If that is the case, an increase in drug enforcement might not
be in accordance with public policy.
220

See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
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Court should not extend the Fourth Amendment any further, but instead
protect individual liberty and privacy by restricting the government’s
suspicionless access to automobiles, both traditional and autonomous.
The Court has said that “if the government intrudes . . . the privacy interest
[of the individual] suffers whether the government’s motivation is to
investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or
regulatory standards.” 221 Thus, a legitimate government purpose to reduce
drug trafficking is not enough to justify a violation of the United States
Constitution. Instead, the government ought to find ways to fight the “war
on drugs” without further invading individuals’ constitutionally protected
rights. Officers are already improperly using routine traffic stops to search
for contraband with regular vehicles. 222 For example, “[t]he federal
government has strongly encouraged state and local enforcement officers
to view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs. It has trained
police officers to use traffic stops to investigate suspected drug
offenses.” 223 Likewise, many courts have essentially accepted that one’s
presence in a high-crime area without much more is sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion. 224 As a result, minority populations are targeted for
stops more frequently than others. 225 Such practices encourage

221

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).

222

See Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 158, at 1852-54; see also United States v. Jones,
234 F.3d 234, 241-42 (5th Cir. 2000).
223

Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 170 n.25 (2002) (citations omitted)
224

See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 171, at 115-24.

225

See generally id. at 116-24 (explaining why using one’s presence in a high-crime area
is problematic). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that:
[s]tops based on race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message
to all our citizens that those who are not white are judged by the color
of their skin alone. Such stops also send a clear message that those who
are not white enjoy a lesser degree of constitutional protection—that
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unconstitutional interference with individuals’ privacy rights and ignore
the requirement for particularized suspicion. Whether the operator is
physically present or not, the individual retains a privacy interest in the
vehicle. The Court has refused to find that the individual loses all privacy
interests when using an automobile. Still, the trend in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with regard to automobiles is the continued erosion of
individuals’ rights in their vehicles. 226 Any further extension of the Fourth
Amendment with regard to automobile stops and searches would
essentially eliminate all individual privacy interests in the automobile. 227
[38] The protections guaranteed to individuals under the Fourth
Amendment have slowly been deteriorating. The Court continues to
empower the government to invade a space that is inherently private to
most people. 228 Professor David Cole argues that “[t]he war on drugs has
put political pressure on judges, which has led them to consistently
they are in effect assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals
second.
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).
226

See Sara L. Shaeffer, Note, Another Dent in Our Fourth Amendment Rights: The
Supreme Court’s Precarious Extension of the Automobile Exception in Wyoming v.
Houghton, 45 S.D. L. REV. 422, 424-26 (2000). See generally James A. Adams, The
Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for Restriction of Citizens’ Fourth
Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833 (1999)
(discussing the diminished Fourth Amendment protection in automobiles).
227

Similarly, this extension is not necessary. Officers have numerous exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment that enable them to get into vehicles, one being consent. Consent
searches essentially provide limitless discretion on the part of officers; any further power
is not necessary. See Rebecca Strauss, supra note 205, at 877-81. If anything, the
police’s power should be lessened.
228

See generally Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or
Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a
Car?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1683 (1999) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Whren, Robinette, and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), have allowed officers to
invade individuals’ privacy more easily).
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overlook constitutional violations by the police where drugs are involved
and to bend and stretch the law to afford the police greater ability to search
without probable cause.” 229 Similarly, the political support for extending
drug checkpoints is simply a campaigning mechanism. 230 The current
trend of slowly allowing more government intrusion will result in
significant violations of individual liberty and Americans who are pacified
to these government intrusions. 231
Americans currently spend a
significant portion of their lives in automobiles. The average American
spends more than twenty-five minutes commuting to work, each way. 232
For the average person, this amounts to approximately 500,000 minutes or
just over 347 days over the course of one’s career, and these figures do not
account for the numerous hours spent commuting elsewhere. 233 It stands
to reason that individuals have a significant privacy interest in the space
where they will spend nearly an entire year of their lives, and some far
229

Comment: A Sane Drug Policy, PROGRESSIVE, October 1999, at 8, 8.

230

See Suzanne Graves, Note, Checkpoints and the Fourth Amendment: Saving Grace or
Constitutional Martyr?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2000). Graves explains that
“[t]he numbers associated with narcotics and weapons checkpoints do not reflect a
serious endeavor to apprehend criminals and deter future crime. Rather, they pacify the
taxpayers while at the same time threaten their basic liberties.” Id. at 1517-18.
231

See Wendy Kaminer, Taking Liberties: The New Assault on Freedom, AM. PROSPECT,
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 33, 39, available at http://prospect.org/article/taking-liberties-0 (“The
trouble is that many people are becoming accustomed to submitting to authority in the
hope of remaining safe. Most of us trudge sheeplike through airports, readily complying
with all the demands of low-level security personnel, who are themselves applying,
without question, the dictates of their superiors.”).
232

BRIAN MCKENZIE, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, OUT-OF-STATE AND LONG
COMMUTES: 2011, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/acs_20_out_of_state_and_long_commute
s_report.pdf.
233

These figures are based on a person commuting five days a week for fifty weeks a
year who enters the workforce at age twenty-five and retires at sixty-five. Volvo
estimates people spend more than a hundred hours commuting per year. See Ross, supra
note 44.
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more. The Court ought to recognize that our society is becoming
increasingly mobile, resulting in individuals spending more time in their
vehicles. 234 Thus, the Court should acknowledge the significant privacy
interest Americans have in their vehicles and adjust the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION
[39] The introduction of AVs into our society is likely to change our
society in countless ways. Inevitably these changes will bring both legal
and social challenges. While many of the resulting issues may have more
clear solutions, like insurance 235 or products liability, 236 the effect AVs
will have on the application of the Fourth Amendment is vague at best.
Current jurisprudence suggests that the police may not have been able to
stop the vehicle in Arvizu had it been operated autonomously without a
physically present operator or any passengers. 237 When police are unable
to observe behavior of the occupants of the vehicle, it is more difficult to
establish reasonable suspicion to make a stop without a traffic violation. It
is especially difficult to establish reasonable suspicion for a spontaneous
stop. 238 Since traffic violations should be rare, if ever, with an AV, 239

234

Additionally, once AVs take over the roads, people will likely use their vehicles as
offices rather than simply for travel. Once that happens, the Court may be forced to
afford more privacy to the individual.
235

See generally Peterson, supra note 82.

236

See generally Garza, supra note 82.

237

See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that reasonable
suspicion was established based on the location of the vehicle and observations of the
driver and passengers given the officer’s experience). It is questionable whether the
circumstances in Arvizu, absent the observations of the driver and the passengers, would
have amounted to reasonable suspicion.
238

See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text
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officers may not be able to stop as many AVs as they might traditional
vehicles. Similarly, the AV engaged by the operator resting on his couch
in New York 240 may not have been stoppable absent prior extrinsic
observation or a tip from a tipster. 241 Thus, the government might request
an extension of the Fourth Amendment to permit more stops. 242
[40] The current trend of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests
that the Court may accept the government’s argument and extend its
authority to conduct stops and searches of automobiles—particularly stops
and searches of AVs in order to prevent the drug trafficker from New
York from transporting contraband in his AV. While the government does
have a legitimate interest in preventing drug and other illegal trafficking,
the price we pay for this is our individual liberty and freedom from undue
government influence. Extension of the government’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment will open the door to unprecedented government
intrusion. The framers of the Fourth Amendment intended to protect
individuals from the intrusions the founding fathers experienced at the
hands of the British government. 243 Without suggesting we ought to
adhere strictly to the framers intent, we ought to consider the broad
purpose for the amendment; that is, protecting our individual liberty and
privacy. 244 Thus, the Supreme Court ought to reject an extension of the
Fourth Amendment in order to curtail the current trend of sacrificing
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See Devin Desai, Autonomous Vehicles: Unintended Upsides and Changes,
17, 2013), http://madisonian.net/2013/03/17/autonomousvehicles-unintended-upsides-and-changes/; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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It might even be the case that the Court refuses to view AVs under the automobile
exception. Instead, the Court might handle AVs as it does mail and other containers, but
that analysis is beyond the scope of this note.
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See Dinger & Dinger, supra note 87 at 6.
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See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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individual liberty and extending the government’s power to invade our
private space.
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